DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 204 425 UD 021 429

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TITLE The Boston Teachers Union and the Desegregation Process.
PUB DATE Dec 80
NOTE 22p.

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Affirmative Action; Elementary Secondary Education; Faculty Integration; *Personnel Policy; Reduction in Force; *School Desegregation; Seniority; Teacher Administrator Relationship; Teacher Associations; Teacher Dismissal; *Teacher Employment; Teacher Recruitment; *Teacher Response; *Union Members; Unions; Urban Schools
IDENTIFIERS *Boston Public Schools MA; Boston Teachers Union

ABSTRACT

This paper traces the interaction between the policies of the Boston Teachers Union and the desegregation of the Boston Public Schools. A case study analysis illustrates how the process of pursuing the social objective of desegregation affects, and is affected by, a number of key aspects of the labor management relationship. These aspects include: (1) recruitment and hiring policies; (2) layoff and transfer policies; (3) the role of seniority versus affirmative action; (4) internal union politics; and (5) the relationships between the union, the courts, the school department, and various community groups. The issue of job security is examined in respect to the entire desegregation process. (Author/APM)

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ED204425

The Boston Teachers Union and the Desegregation Process

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December 1980

*The author is Assistant Professor of Economics and Management and gratefully acknowledges helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Henry Farber, Robert McKersie, Charles Myers, Paul Osterman, Peter Temin and Thomas Kochan.

UD 021 429

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Introduction

Extensive steps were taken in the 1970s in an effort to desegregate the nation's public school systems.[1] In contrast to early efforts at desegregation, in the 1970s desegregation occurred when most public school teachers were members of well established unions. Consequently, an understanding of the desegregation experience in the 1970s must consider how teacher union policies responded to and, in turn, affected the desegregation process.

This paper traces the interaction between the policies of the Boston Teachers Union (BTU) and the desegregation of the Boston public schools.[2] This case study illustrates how the process of pursuing the social objective of desegregation affects (and is affected by) a number of key aspects of the labor-management relationship such as (1) recruitment and hiring policies; (2) layoff and transfer policies; (3) the role of seniority versus affirmative action; (4) internal union politics; and (5) the relationships between the union, the courts, the school department, and various community groups. Events in Boston take place within the context of fiscal austerity and declining school enrollments. Therefore, the issue of job security looms behind the entire process. Since these pressures and problems are common to many urban school districts, the experiences in Boston to date are likely to be indicative of what other parties are confronting or will confront in the years ahead.

The Court Ordered Desegregation Plan

On June 21, 1974, Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr. of the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Boston School Committee had unconstitutionally fostered and maintained a segregated public school system.[3] That

court decision arose out of a suit filed by the NAACP on behalf of black school children and followed investigations by the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Judge Garrity concluded that through an array of policies the Boston School Committee had fostered segregation and had actively worked to avoid enforcement of the Racial Imbalance Act of the State of Massachusetts. Through feeder patterns, and enrollment and transfer policies two subsystems had been created in the Boston schools. One subsystem was 71% non-white and the other 76% white. The very existence of such subsystems made voluntary desegregation efforts difficult. In addition, the court concluded that the use and location of school facilities were designed to promote segregation.

Faced with the complicated task of implementing desegregation, the court found it necessary to order a remedial desegregation plan that involved three phases. In the face of the short period of time that remained between the court's initial June ruling and the start of the upcoming school year in September, the court ordered that the first phase of desegregation (to take effect in September 1974) involve the implementation of an existing state "redistricting" plan originally designed to bring Boston schools in compliance with the state's Racial Imbalance Act. Judge Garrity then ordered the Boston School Committee to develop a full plan to desegregate the Boston schools. The School Committee failed to submit to the court a comprehensive desegregation plan and thereby thrust the design of desegregation back into the hands of the Federal Court. Judge Garrity, with the guidance of an appointed panel of experts, designed an extensive desegregation plan (Phase II) to be implemented starting in the fall of 1975. In the spring of 1976 the desegregation plan was

modified further by the court in what came to be known as the third phase (Phase II-B) of the desegregation effort.

The complete desegregation plan included new community school districts, citywide magnet schools, and the busing of school children. In addition, various councils of parents, teachers, and school officials were established by the court to monitor compliance with the court orders and facilitate community involvement in the desegregation process. At times throughout the desegregation process, these various councils clashed with one another or with other participants within the school system. Later, we discuss a recent dispute that emerged between parents and teachers. Although Judge Garrity has suggested that he would like to completely return administrative responsibility to the Boston School Committee, as of the winter of 1981 the court was still continuously involved in insuring compliance with its orders.

The BTU was not pleased with the desegregation effort. Early on the BTU had expressed its opposition to the state "redistricting plan" which had been designed to bring Boston schools in conformance with the 1965 State Racial Imbalance Act (that redistricting plan was later implemented as Phase I of Judge Garrity's desegregation order). The union, like many teachers in the school system, was unsympathetic to charges that the school system was blatantly discriminatory and required major restructuring to set it right. In addition, the BTU argued that reorganization of the school system would be "too educationally disruptive."[4] Instead, the union favored an expanded program of magnet schools and voluntary transfers.

The BTU was particularly upset about the large number of teacher transfers and reassignments that were produced by desegregation. These

transfers and reassignments followed the creation of new schools, the closing of a number of schools, and large scale reorganizations of within-school programs which were all part of the desegregation plan. The Boston Teachers Union estimates that from one to two-thousand teachers were transferred as part of desegregation. To facilitate those transfers, the court felt it necessary to overrule existing language in the collective bargaining agreement between the Boston School Committee and the teachers' union which regulated transfer rights. The court argued that both the speed and the magnitude of the transfers precluded the use of the elaborate bidding and rating transfer procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement.

Once court-ordered desegregation had begun the BTU repeatedly petitioned Judge Garrity for relief from extensive teacher transfers and reassignments.[5] The teachers' union protested that mandatory transfers violated the placement rights teachers had accumulated through years of service. The union also petitioned for a delay in the implementation of the additional phases of Judge Garrity's desegregation plan.

The union's complaint against the desegregation plan involved procedural as well as substantative issues. The BTU adamantly protested the process by which the court overruled parts of the existing collective bargaining agreement between the union and the School Committee. The union had another procedural complaint as well, namely, the union's limited involvement in the design of the desegregation plan. Having grown accustomed to negotiating with the School Committee over policy changes that affected personnel, the union was upset by the court's control of decision-making authority. Of course, the union's procedural and substan-

tive complaints were interrelated. The union wanted a more active voice in desegregation so as to influence the decisions being made.

By the fall of 1977, the bulk of the restructuring of school programs and boundaries initiated by Judge Garrity's orders had been completed. From that point on, the aspect of the desegregation process which precipitated the most heated response from the BTU was Judge Garrity's effort to provide greater racial balance in the teaching staff of the Boston school system. To induce change in the racial composition of the faculty, Judge Garrity issued a number of "hiring orders." Judge Garrity's hiring orders initially may have appeared to be only an incidental part of his complete desegregation orders. Yet, those orders have had important consequences for the teachers' union and the school system as a whole. A review of the history of those hiring orders, to which we now turn, will provide a background for our analysis of the union's response to those orders.

Judge Garrity's initial hiring order of July 31, 1974 included a number of components. The order set out as a goal that black teachers comprise 20% of all teachers in the Boston public school system.[6] In the 1973-74 school year black teachers made up 7.1% of the total. To attain the 20% figure, Judge Garrity ordered that the school system hire one black teacher for each new white teacher hired, to the extent that qualified black candidates were available. In addition, Judge Garrity ordered the immediate hiring of 280 new permanent black teachers. Implementation of that part of the order alone increased the percentage of black teachers in the system from 7.1% to 10.7%.

The judge also outlined procedures the school department should follow in order to recruit additional black faculty (such as appointing three

black recruiters). To assist in monitoring compliance with its orders, the court required the preparation of long range recruitment plans and periodic reports describing recruitment efforts and hiring figures.

The School Department's Response

The school department complied with Judge Garrity's order to hire 280 new permanent black teachers for the 1974-75 school year, but then proceeded to dramatically alter its hiring policies. From September 1975 on, the Boston school department continued to hire a number of new teachers, but only hired new teachers on a provisional basis (one year contracts) and discontinued the hiring of teachers on a permanent contractual basis.[7]

The motives behind this switch in hiring policy are not clear. A substantial degree of uncertainty surrounded enrollment levels and the future course of court mandates. In the face of that uncertainty, the school department may have looked to the employment of provisional teachers as a device to deal with uncertain and changing manning requirements. In addition, school officials may have turned to provisional teachers as a cost-cutting device. Provisional teachers enter at lower salary levels and receive fewer fringe benefits than permanent hires.[8] In this way, the hiring of provisional teachers may reflect the "price responsiveness" of school officials who look to provisional teachers as a cheaper source of labor than permanent teachers whose price (wage) had been raised by gains won in collective bargaining.[9] But, the school department rehired many of the provisional teachers year after year and lost some of these economic benefits when an arbitrator ruled that in conformance with state law a provisional teacher (like a permanent teacher) acquires tenure and many of

its accompanying benefits after working in the system for three consecutive years.

An alternative motive for the school department's policy may have been that it provided a way in which the school department could avoid the hiring of blacks. In his January 28, 1975 hiring order Judge Garrity included a provision that allowed the school department to rehire any provisional teacher employed the year before and not be bound in such rehiring by the one black for each white requirement. The Judge later lamented the consequences of the exception and subsequently amended his hiring order as the school department continually rehired white provisional teachers. In the interim, that rehiring policy and the difficulties the school department allegedly encountered in recruiting qualified blacks led to slow progress in meeting the court's goal of a 20% black teacher workforce. As of the 1975-76 school year the percentage of black teachers stood at 11.4% (it was 10.4% in 1974-75) and rose to 15.6% by 1978-79.[10]

Table 1 reports the racial composition and the date of hire of the provisional teachers employed in the 1978-79 school year. These figures illustrate that it was not until 1977-78 that the school department actually attained the spirit of Judge Garrity's one for one hiring rule. It is also important to note the sizeable number of provisional teachers that were hired from 1975 on. Remember, this hiring occurred when the school department was no longer hiring new permanent teachers and the number of permanent teachers in the school system steadily declined through attrition. The total number of teachers in the Boston system has declined from 5443 in the 1975-76 school year to 5187 in 1978-79.[11]

TABLE I

BREAKDOWN OF WHITE, BLACK AND OTHER MINORITY

PROVISIONAL TEACHERS EMPLOYED IN 1978-79

Year First Hired	Black	White	Other Minority	Total
1978-79	207	61	66	334
1977-78	75	72	31	178
1976-77	58	138	49	245
1975-76*	81	185	36	302
Totals	421	456	182	1059

From "Report of the Numbers of White, Black, and Other Minority Permanent and Acting Administrators," School Committee of Boston, March 14, 1979, Table ii.

*Provisional teachers with more than three years of continuous service acquire permanent status and tenure.

Whatever the motives for the school department's shift to the hiring of provisional rather than permanent teachers, the exclusive hiring of new teachers on a provisional basis could not have helped the school department's efforts to recruit black teachers. Much of this recruitment activity involved trying to encourage black teachers to shift into the Boston system from other school systems in the Boston metropolitan area or from school systems in more distant locations. The absence of new permanent teacher contracts must have made this already difficult task more difficult.

Frustrated by the school system's slow progress in increasing the number of black teachers, Judge Garrity modified his hirng orders further on July 5, 1978. The new orders mandated that except for the rehiring of third year provisional teachers, all hiring and rehiring of teachers be done on a basis of one black for one white until in each school year there is a 1 1/2% increase in the percentage of black teachers in the school system. The court thereby blocked the school department's policy of continually rehiring a disproportionate number of white provisional teachers.

With system-wide black emloyment at 15.5% of the total employment in the 1978-79 school year, if the school system only met the 1 1/2% per year minimum, it would take three years until the court's goal of 20% black employment was attained. In its new orders the court rejected motions entered by the plaintiffs in the desegregation case to either grant existing black provisional teachers "super-seniority" in future hiring decisions or mandate the immediate awarding of tenure to black provisional teachers who had completed at least one year's teaching experience in the Boston system.[12]

Judge Garrity's refusal to grant black teachers "super-seniority" is consistent with some court decisions in related cases. For example, adhering to a seniority clause, in 1976, the city of Cincinnati laid off newly hired black firemen. A federal court then upheld those layoffs even though the layoffs jeopardized satisfaction of a consent decree which included minority employment goals for Cincinnati's fire department.[13]

The BTU's Response

As an interested party, the Boston Teachers Union submitted a response to the plaintiff's motion which preceded Judge Garrity's revised hiring order of July 5, 1978.[14] In that response the union adamantly expressed its opposition to "any order which gives preferential treatment to black provisional teachers."[15] Instead, the union recommended strict adherence to the seniority principle as the guideline for appointments and layoffs.

In the face of increased minority representation among teachers, the BTU's attitudes towards Judge Garrity's hiring orders did not go unchallenged within the union. After hearing a report concerning the plaintiff's motion and the official union response to that motion, in a general meeting union members voted to establish a special committee to "formulate a positive BTU position on minority hiring to be submitted to" a later meeting of the membership.[16] The special committee later met and formulated a list of proposals which included support for the goal of a 20% or more black teaching staff and encouraged the adoption of measures to increase minority recruitment. The BTU executive board then strongly voted down those proposals and after intense debate at a subsequent general membership meeting, the proposals were tabled. The union's general opposition to the court's hiring goals continued.

The dispute over the racial composition of teachers in the Boston school system has introduced a choice between seniority or affirmative action. In this way, the dispute has become a classic example of the dilemma which has plagued courts and unions throughout the United States in recent years. In this case, the union has unequivocally sided for the preservation of seniority. That choice can, in part, be explained by the fact that the strict preservation of seniority rights serves the interests of the older, white, permanent teachers--the politically powerful component of the BTU's membership.[17] In addition, the BTU, like most other unions, finds it extremely difficult to contemplate the abandonment of the seniority principle which has served as one of the basic tenets of the American collective bargaining system.

The preservation of seniority rights is now particularly important to the BTU because of the threat of teacher layoffs in the Boston school system. That threat is a consequence of the massive enrollment declines that have occurred in the Boston school system in the 1970s. In 1965 total enrollment in the school system stood at 94,035. Enrollment climbed to 97,344 in 1970 and then declined to 84,988 in 1975 and by the end of the 1979-80 school year stood at 67,527.[18] If class size was kept constant at the level of 25 students per class and teacher workloads remained constant, the drop in enrollment of 29,817 which occurred betwen 1970 and 1980 would facilitate a potential reduction of 1193 teacners (or 23% of the total number of teachers in 1973-74).[19]

As in the seniority-affirmative action dispute, the hiring of provisional teachers created a situation in which the BTU has chosen to side with the interests of its traditional membership. When reviewing the

course of relations in the 1970s between the BTU and the school department it might at first seem surprising to learn that the BTU did not adamantly resist the increased hiring of provisional teachers and the halt in the hiring of new permanent teachers. No union likes the wage and benefit reductions that accompanied the shift from permanent to provisional contracts and one might have expected the BTU to firmly resist the change in the school department's hiring policy. Yet, the BTU appears to have acquiesced rather passively to that new hiring policy.

In fact, it can be argued that the BTU took a number of steps to exacerbate the differences in the status of permanent and provisional teachers. One such step was the union's negotiation of a job security agreement (a school department promise not to lay off) covering only permanent teachers in the 1975 contract settlement. Union actions concerning job security continued to protect only permanent teachers when the "excess" procedure regulating seniority and bumping rights negotiated in the fall of 1978 excluded teachers on provisional status.

The BTU's actions, as in the seniority vs. affirmative action dispute, can be explained as part of the union's efforts to protect the interests of the traditional and politically dominant component of the union's membership, namely, the older permanent teachers. There was an ever-present possibility that the School Committee would respond to declining enrollments by laying-off teachers. The existence of a separate class of teachers with provisional status provided some assurance to permanent teachers that any layoffs that did occur would not spread into their own ranks. Steps such as limiting the coverage of the excess procedure served to insulate further permanent teachers from the threat of layoff.

When responding to a layoff threat by acquiescing in the creation of a "protected" and "unprotected" class of workers, the BTU was following a road previously travelled by a number of other unions. For example, in the 1950s in the West coast longshoring industry, containerization brought the threat of workforce reductions. The longshoremens' union responded by creating a similar two-class system--one class of protected senior workers who received job security and another class of unprotected junior workers who were without similar job security.[20]

Internal Union Politics

BTU policies which exacerbated the differentiation between permanent and provisional teachers did create some internal political problems within the union. Provisional teachers, as an increasing fraction of the teacher workforce, struggled to redirect the policies of the BTU. It is important to note that tensions were increased between these teacher groups because of the large minority representation among provisional teachers.[21] Provisional teachers were also, on average, a much younger workforce than the permanent teaching staff. Both the youthfulness and the racial composition of the provisional workforce led them to oppose the BTU's long-standing opposition to desegregation and the union's preference for more modest minority hiring goals. Furthermore, provisional teachers demanded that the BTU more aggressively push their particular interests, such as increased salaries, benefits, and job security for provisional teachers, in contract negotiations with the School Committee.

Many of the complaints against traditional BTU policies expressed by restive provisional and minority teachers had the support of teacher aides, another increasingly important fraction of the BTU's membership. By

1978-79 there were approximately 1500 aides in the school system.[22] And, like provisional teachers, a large fraction of the aides were either black or some other minority. In the 1975-76 school year, 43.4% of all aides were black and 10.6% were other nonwhite minorities.[23]

Dissension within the ranks of the BTU led to the creation of a slate of candidates (the New Unity Coalition) which ran for positions on the union's executive board in elections in the spring of 1978.[24] That slate was comprised heavily of minorities, provisional teachers and aides, and supported policies that would have promoted the interests of all three of those groups. Although the slate failed to elect anyone to the executive board, its strength in a primary election signalled the presence of significant dissension within the union.

One can speculate as to how the union's internal political balance will respond to these new claims. A possible course is for union policies to gradually shift so as to accommodate the desires of the newer members. Alternatively, the union's leadership and policies may continue to be dominated by the traditional membership--the older, predominantly white, permanent teachers. Following this latter scenario, at some point in time an explosive struggle for control of the union may occur between the traditional groups in the union and a coalition of minority and provisional teachers and aides.

Shifting Coalitions: The Union, The Court, and Community Groups

As well as struggling over its internal political alignment, the BTU is faced with the task of directing its relationship with external parties such as the court and the Boston community. As discussed earlier, the BTU has generally been opposed to the thrust of Judge Garrity's desegregation

and hiring orders. And yet, as the desegregation process has continued, the BTU has at times found that there are advantages to court involvement in the school system. For example, until the spring of 1980, in fights over the extent of school closings, the BTU frequently found itself on the same side as Judge Garrity in opposition to cutbacks proposed by Mayor White or the School Committee. Teachers wanted to stop school closings in order to protect their jobs while Judge Garrity acted to protect the desegregation effort. The BTU has also supported steps taken by Judge Garrity which insured the fiscal solvency of the school system. In the spring of 1976, the union supported an order issued by Judge Garrity that forced Mayor White to fund a full school term even though the School Committee had accumulated a large deficit. Ironically, if at some point in the future the School Committee decides to impose substantial layoffs of teachers, the BTU may very well find itself arguing before Judge Garrity that teacher layoffs should be stopped because they threaten the court's minority hiring targets.

The BTU's relationship with community groups and parents is marked with the same ambivalence that characterizes the union's relationship with the court. As a public sector union, the BTU is dependent upon parents and the wider community for support of its bargaining demands with the School Committee. Without that support, the bargaining power of the BTU would be severely weakened.

Teachers and parents have found a commonality of interests on a number of issues. Teachers and parents have frequently joined together in support of expanded school programs and in opposition to school closings. Yet, as part of the desegregation process, a number of disputes have arisen in

which the BTU and parents stood on opposing sides. For example, to monitor desegregation, the court created various parent and "citizen advisory" groups. A clash occurred in the fall if 1979 when parents entered the classroom as part of their efforts to monitor compliance with the desegregation order. Teachers and the BTU resented the intrusion of parents into the classroom, fearing that it might lead to parental involvement in evaluations of teacher performance. The union petitioned the court to stop the practice. Judge Garrity then upheld the rights of parents to enter the classroom as a legitimate aspect of their monitoring responsibilities. Other union policies which favored permanent teachers put the union in alliance with some parental groups and in opposition to other parents who supported the claims of minority and provisional teachers. One consequence of the latter is that the union's internal politics became intertwined with the union's "external" relationship with parents and community groups.

Conclusion

The early stages of school desegregation in Boston were marked by a series of court orders which set out to reshape the educational process. Over time, the desegregation effort has generated a host of labor-management issues and taken on the character of a complex bargaining process. For example, as the case study illustrates, the early court orders that sought changes in the racial composition of the faculty led to counterproposals, delays and countermoves by the school department and the BTU. The steps taken by the BTU in turn initiated both political conflict

within the union and interactions between the union and community groups. Desegregation of the Boston public schools has thereby come to involve the same shifting political coalitions and competing demands that now so commonly arise in urban America.

FOOTNOTES

1. Court actions in desegregation cases throughout the country are surveyed in, "Supplement to School Desegregation: A Report of State and Federal Judicial and Administrative Activity," National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C., December 1978.

2. The Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 of the American Federation of Teachers, has represented and negotiated collective bargaining agreements for public school teachers in Boston since 1965.

3. The Boston desegregation case is discussed in, "A Citizen's Guide to School Desegregation Law," National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C., July 1978, pp. 39-41, and Desegregating the Boston Public Schools: A Crisis in Civic Responsibility, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C., 1975. Judge Garrity's desegregation plan is reported in "Memorandum of Decision and Remedial Orders," U.S. District Court of Massachusetts, Civil Action No. 72-911-G, Morgan V. Hennigan, D. Mass., June 5, 1974, 379 F. Supp. 410,482. Also see "The Boston Case" by Ralph R. Smith in Limits of Justice: The Court's Role in School Desegregation, H. Kalodner and J. Fishman eds., Ballinger Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978.

4. See the desegregation story in The Boston Union Teacher, March 1974, p. 1.

5. See stories on desegregation in The Boston Union Teacher, October 1974 and March 1975.

6. See "Order on Hiring," July 31, 1974, U.S. District Court of Massachusetts. The 20% figure was equal to the fraction of the total population of Boston that was black according to the 1970 census. In this and later hiring orders the court stipulated that in meeting the one black for each white requirement, the hiring of other minorities would not count as the hiring of either a black or a white.

7. The number of provisional teachers was 698 (1973-74), 714 (1974-75), 947 (1975-76), 1050 (1976-77), 857 (1977-78) 1059 (1978-79). These figures are from "City Defendant's Report on Reassignments and Hiring of Teachers," various dates, submitted to U.S. District Court of Massachusetts.

8. The 1978-80 collective bargaining agreement between the BTU and the School Committee states that regarding provisional teachers, "...in no event shall they be placed on a step higher than the third step of the bachelor's salary schedule." See the "Contract Between the Boston Teachers Union and the School Committee of the City of Boston," September 1, 1978, Article 2, Section A-11(a), p. 9. Traditionally, provisional teachers had been hired by the school department to temporarily fill vacancies created by teachers on leave or sabbatical.

9. For evidence of price responsiveness in the municipal budgetary process see, Harry C. Katz, "The Municipal Budgetary Response to Changing Labor Costs: The Case of San Francisco," Industrial and Labor Relations Re-Review, July 1979, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 506-519.

10. These figures are from the "Report of the Numbers of White, Black and Other Minority Permanent and Acting Administrators," School Committee of Boston, March 14, 1979, Table i.

11. Provisional teachers made up 17.4% and 20.4% of total teachers, respectively, in 1975-76 and 1978-79. The number of total teachers used in these calculations and cited in the text is taken from Ibid.

12. "Plaintiffs' Motion for Further Relief and Supplementary Orders Enforcing the January 28, 1975 Orders on Faculty Recruiting and Hiring," March 31, 1978, submitted to U.S. District Court of Massachusetts.

13. See "Government Employee Relations Report," BNA, No. 744, p. 12, January 30, 1978. Also see, "Affirmative Action Versus Seniority — Is Conflict Inevitable?", Bonnie G. Cebulski, Calif. Pub. Emp. Rels. Monograph Series, 1977. In a recent decision a federal judge nullified a seniority layoff procedure arguing that it contradicted desegregation goals. See, Daily Labor Reports, No. 199, October 10, 1980, p. A-10, B.N.A.

14. "Boston Teacher Union's Response to 'Plaintiffs' Motion," April 18, 1978, submitted to U.S. District Court of Massachusetts.

15. Ibid., p. 2.

16. See the June 8, 1978 letter of the AFT Caucus on Desegregation and Equality in Education to the general BTU membership.

17. A reading of old union newspapers suggests that there has never been an executive officer of the union who was either black or a provisional teacher.

18. Enrollment (membership) figures for the years 1965 through 1975 are available in, "Annual Statistics of the Boston Public Schools," Boston School Committee, various years. Figures for the 1979-80 school year come from "Analysis of Students by Race by Grade 1979-80," June 15, 1980, Information and Statistics Section, Boston School Department.

19. There were 5,214 teachers in the school system in the year 1973-74. This figure is from "City Defendent's Report on Reassignment and Hiring of Teachers," U.S. District Court of Massachusetts, September 27, 1974, p. 6. Unfortunately, consistent numbers of teachers in the system prior to 1973 are not available.

20. This two-class system is described in Paul T. Hartman, Collective Bargaining and Mechanization, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973.

21. See Table 1.

22. Aides were included in the BTU as of 1973 and the collective bargaining agreement between the BTU and the School Committee included separate provisions covering aides as of 1974.

23. See "Summary of Total Staff by Assignment, Sex, and Race," in "Selected Annual Statistics of the Boston Public Schools 1975-76," Boston School Committee, Table 46, p. 63.

24. The campaign planks of the New Unity Coalition and election results are reported in The Boston Union Teacher, May 1979, June 1979, and July 1979. In a primary election nine candidates from the New Unity Coalition running for spots on the executive board qualified for the final ballot.